This paper considers an intertemporal decision problem in which the agent has limited foresight. It offers an interpretation of why people may smoke when they are young -and arguably have a short horizon of foresight -and refrain from smoking when they get older -and their foresight gets better.
Introduction
In this paper we shall consider why some people decide to take up smoking when young, despite knowing the dangers, then, when older, give up -often at considerable effort and after several attempts. In our model the central issue will relate to a change in horizon of foresight. We shall imagine that when people are young they foresee the consequences of their acts only a few years ahead, and form no view of what might happen after that. Then, as they grow older (although they still do not have perfect foresight) they start to foresee a little further ahead than before.
This change in horizon of foresight alone, without any need to assume that preferences change, is sufficient to generate a change in behaviour.
The paper is organized as follows: First we detail the setting, and then explain what precisely we mean by "limited foresight". Next we use our setup to generate examples in which the decision of whether to smoke or not to smoke is sensitive to the horizon of foresight. Then we discuss the implications and relevance of these examples.
Setup
A decision-maker faces infinitely-many stages, with a decision to make at each stage. His decision in each period t consists in a choice of action a t ∈ A where A is a finite choice set. His preferences are captured by
where ω t ∈ Ω is a state variable, U (a t , ω t ) is the flow of payoff derived by the agent in period t, and δ is the discount factor between periods. The state evolves according to a deterministic process mapping the period t profile of state ω t and action a t onto the period t + 1 state ω t (i.e., (ω t , a t ) → ω t+1 ). Thus, the state at period t + k can be written as a function ω t+k ω, a 0 , a 1 , ..., a k−1 where ω t = ω denotes the period t state and a t+l = a l the period t + l action. We note that in a standard paradigm with perfect foresight there is no "time inconsistency" problem -that is to say, once a plan of what to do in the future is formed, when the decision-maker gets there he doesn't change his mind. What he thought would be the best thing to do in the future continues to be the best thing to do once the future becomes the present. This is due to the fact that discounting takes an exponential form so that the marginal rate of substitution (in terms of overall preference) between an increase of utility in period t and an increase of utility in period t + k does not change with the time period t. This is a generalization of a result first noted by Strotz (1956 ).
The limited foresight approach
We turn now to describing the decision making of an agent with limited foresight. We first review the basic concepts and then offer some preliminary results.
Concepts
In a limited foresight problem, the decision-maker can see ahead only n periods (including the current period), and forms no view as to what happens beyond the horizon of foresight. The following definition (in the spirit of Jehiel 1995) describes how an agent with limited foresight behaves 1 .
Definition 1 A stream of actions {a t (ω)} t,ω is a "limited foresight n-equilibrium" (or "LFE-n") if and only if 2 , ∀t, ω,
1 Jehiel (2001) extends the treatment to consider problems in which a guess -modelled as a source of randomness -is formed at the horizon. Such problems will not concern us here. 2 We restrict attention to deterministic action schemes that may only depend on the time period t and the current state ω, hence a t (ω). Following Jehiel (1995) , it can be shown that this is without loss of generality, as long as the agent's choice of action is deterministic and cannot (directly) depend on actions that took place more than N periods earlier (i.e., as long as the agent has bounded recall).
3 Note that ω k depends on a for k ≥ 1, so a k depends on a too. To understand the idea of this solution concept (but in a finite, rather than an infinite setting) consider Figure 1 . In Figure 1 we have a one-person decision problem. Each circle represents a point at which an action is to be taken. The branches of the tree represent those actions, and at the first two decision-points the agent can choose to go up or down in the tree. Branches which have no sub-branches represent terminal nodes. The decision-maker receives payoffs after each action corresponding to the numbers. Suppose that he can see ahead one period (corresponding to n = 2). Then from period one he can see that if he goes down to start with he will receive a payoff of 1 and the game will end, while if he chooses to go up then he will be able to choose between a payoff of 2 if he goes up as his second action and 0 if he goes down.
Under the solution concept of Definition 1 we have in mind an agent who is aware of his limited foresight. He has perhaps played the game many times before (or seen other similar agents playing it), and is aware that, from this situation, if he were to choose to go up at the first decision-point, he would then choose to go down at the second 4 . He is not sure why he would do this, i.e. he does have limited foresight. But he has learned that that would be his behaviour, and what he has learned is correct. So at the first decision point he believes (correctly) that he is choosing between going down and receiving a payoff of 1, or going up and receiving a payoff of 0 this period and next period. He goes down, and the LFE-2 strategy (reading decisionpoints from the left) is (Down, Down, Up, Up). Note that this is different from the sub-game perfect strategy, which is (Up, Down, Up, Up).
Definition 2 A stream of actions {a t (ω)} t,ω is a "p-controlled n-equilibrium" (or "LFE-(p, n)") if and only if, ∀t, ω
In this case we divide the foresight horizon into a period over which the decision-maker plans what to do, p (which we shall refer to as his "planning horizon"), and the period over which he merely has exogenous expectations of what he will do, n − p.
The interpretation of Definition 2 is as follows. Condition A means that in every period t and in all states ω, the agent chooses an optimal plan a 0 , ..., a p−1 over his planning horizon given his expectations a p , ..., a n−1 about what will happen next within his horizon of foresight. Condition B expresses the idea that expectations a p , ..., a n−1 are correct, while condition C expresses the idea that within his planning horizon the agent does not change his mind. That is, when the agent reaches period t + k, he finds it optimal to do what he had planned to do at this period k periods earlier, i.e. at period t 5 . When the agent has perfect foresight (n = +∞), it is readily verified that an LFE-(p, +∞) exists and that it coincides with the standard perfect foresight optimal plan. This is a simple adaptation/generalization of Strotz (1956)' s result (it is due to the exponential character of the discounting). It is also immediate to see that a limited foresight equilibrium LFE-n corresponds to a p-controlled n-equilibrium or LFE-(p, n) with a planning horizon of p = 1 and that any LFE-(p, n) is also a LFE-n.
In general, while an LFE-(1, n) always exists, an LFE-(p, n) need not exist when p > 1 (see below). The next definition suggests looking at those LFE-(p, n) which have a maximal planning horizon p.
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Definition 3 A stream of actions {a t (ω)} t,ω is a "best-controlled n-equilibrium" (or "LFEB-n") if and only if it is an LFE-(p,n) and there is no LFE-(p ,n) with p > p.
The motivation for a best-controlled n-equilibrium is that an agent may find it desirable to feel he has as much control over his planning scheme as possible subject to the constraint that he does not change his mind (relative to plans made earlier) 7 .
Preliminary Results
Proposition 1 There always exists an LFE-n. All LFE-n are cyclical -i.e.
Proof. (Sketch) Start from any profile of n-expectations, i.e. f 0 (ω, a) ∈ A n . For any ω, a * f 0 (ω) is a best-action given f . Construct f −1 as follows: For any ω, if a is chosen, let ω denote the new state. Take the sequence of actions generated by a * f 0 (ω ) and f 0 ω , a * f 0 (ω ) . Take the truncation of these to the first n ones. Define this to be f −1 (ω, a). Define recursively f −k (ω, a). At some point, because everything is finite, f −k will correspond to f −k , k = k . This allows us to show existence and the cyclical nature of limited foresight plans. N.B. this is analagous to Jehiel (1995) .
It is instructive to observe that LFE-(p, n) need not exist when n ≥ 2 and p ≥ 2. For example, in the decision tree of Figure 1 there is no LFE-(2, 2). At the first node, the optimal 2-plan is (Up, Up), but upon reaching the next node, the agent would choose Down and not Up violating the constraint that he should not change his mind within his planning horizon (Constraint C of Definition 2). Despite the possible inexistence of LFE-(p, n), we can infer from Proposition 1 that an LFEB-n always exists. This is because LFE-1 and LFE-(1, 1) are equivalent concepts. 4 To smoke, or not to smoke? That is the question... Now we shall employ the concepts we have introduced to address the question of why some people might smoke when young, then give up when older. In so doing we shall interpret a younger (resp. older) person as one with shorter (resp. longer) horizon of foresight. We shall make the following simplifying assumptions: A1) A = {D, S} : there are two actions, which we shall interpret as Don't Smoke and Smoke. A2) ω t = (a t−1 a t−2 ...a t−m ) : the state variable is defined to be the m previous period actions.
A3) ∃δ such that, for all δ ≥ δ, there is one perfect foresight optimal plan, which is a t (ω) = D, ∀ω, t.
In the sequel we shall analyze how the plan of an agent who has limited foresight varies with his horizon of foresight. A3 tells us that an agent with perfect foresight chooses D in all states ω and in all periods. In light of the smoker's problem, A3 sounds plausible to us.
Let us focus on the sustainability or otherwise of the following two stationary plans.
Plan D : a t (ω) = D, ∀ω, t Plan S : a t (ω) = S, ∀ω, t We are interested in whether or not there exists δ such that for all δ ≥ δ plan a, a = D or S, is sustainable as LFE-n. This is equivalent 8 to checking the sustainability of these plans as LFE-n in the special case δ = 1. From here on we shall assume that δ = 1.
When the horizon of foresight is long enough
We first show that when the horizon of foresight n is strictly greater than the hindsight dependence m, the only possible plan is D.
Proposition 2
And only plan D can be an LFE-(m + 1) :
When the horizon of foresight is short
When the horizon of foresight is smaller than m + 1 a completely different picture arises. We shall focus attention on proving that, if the horizon of foresight is not too long, there are a number of scenarios in which Plan S would be optimal, and some in which Plan D would not be optimal. We offer the interpretation that those who smoke may face decision-problems like those below.
In the sequel, we shall specialize to the case of m = 2.
When Plan S (but not D) is a limited foresight equilibrium: Consider the following payoffs (reading states horizontally and this-period actions vertically): Table 1 This system of payoffs guarantees that if the agent is patient enough (δ close to 1), the optimal perfect foresight plan is to never smoke, i.e. Plan D.
9 Hence, Assumption A3 is satisfied. We next observe that Plan D is not an LFE-2. This is because, for example,
Thus, anticipating he will not smoke in the next period, the agent would be better off smoking today if yesterday he smoked and the day before he did not. Thus plan D is not an LFE-2.
Finally, Plan S is an LFE-2. This is because the following system of inequalities is satisfied (checking all possible states):
Hence, whatever the state, the agent finds it optimal to choose S today if he anticipates he will choose S tomorrow.
In the above example, Plan D is an LFE-3, but Plan S is not (see Proposition 2). Additionally, Plan S is an LFE-2, but Plan D is not (see above calculations). Thus if decision-makers faced such preferences at a time when their foresight horizon was relatively short (2) they would smoke. If subsequently (and unexpectedly) their foresight horizon later became longer they would switch to not smoking. We shall discuss this further below.
When Plan S is a better-controlled plan than Plan D: Another type of scenario in which people might smoke is one in which, although both Plans would be equilibria if we took our future behaviour as exogenous, if we 9 To see this, observe that obtaining the highest payoff U (S, SD) = 11 would require a bad experience associated with U (S, SS) = 9 or U (S, DS) = 8. It is thus not worthwhile. Table 2 Again, it can be checked that Plan D is the only optimal perfect foresight plan.
Also, both Plans D and S are LFE-2. For Plan S this is because
For Plan D this is because
Although both Plans D and S are LFE-2s, only Plan S is an LFEB-2. We know that with p = 1 both Plans are LFE-(1, 2)s, since an LFE-(1, 2) is formally equivalent to an LFE-2. Thus for Plan S to be an LFEB-2 but Plan D not, Plan S must be an LFE-(2, 2) but Plan D not. For Plan S to be an LFE-(2, 2) it should be that for all states the best 2-plan is to Smoke in the current and next period. This requires the following inequalities in addition to those required for LFE-2:
It is easily verified that these all hold. In contrast, the equivalent inequalities for Plan D do not all hold. In particular, we have 14 :
Thus, when the state is ω = SD, the best 2-plan is not DD, since it is dominated by SS. So Plan D is not an LFE-(2, 2) and Plan S is the sole LFEB-2.
Once again, if decision-makers faced such preferences at a time when their foresight horizon was relatively short (2) they might smoke, then if their foresight horizon later became longer they might again switch to not smoking.
A tale about the smoker's problem: In Section 4 we have seen that it is possible to switch the decision of whether to smoke or not smoke simply by changing the horizon of foresight. We propose to interpret this in terms of an (unanticipated) change in foresight over the life-cycle. We suggest that younger people may have less ability to look ahead into the future than older people, and that this offers some insight into why significant numbers of young people take up smoking, only to give it up in middle-life.
Let us think for a moment how relevant our examples are to the problem of why people smoke. How plausible are our payoffs -does our result depend 14 6 + 10 = 16 < 21 = 14 + 7 on some very particular arrangement of payoffs which is unlikely to exist in reality?
Think first of the payoffs shown in Table 1 . There the least desirable things to be doing in any period are either to start smoking having had a history of not smoking, or to stop smoking having smoked (U (S, DD) = U (D, SS) = 0). Anyone who has turned green after smoking his first cigarette or struggled to stop smoking will attest to the plausibility of this.
The highest payoff comes from smoking having just recently started (U (S, SD) = 11). Presumably, since many people go on to be smokers after enduring the unpleasantness of the first cigarette, there is probably a period between just starting and when smoking becomes routine in which smoking is very enjoyable.
Not smoking in any one period having not smoked previously (U (D, DD) = 10) is not so attractive as the period just after one has begun smoking (which presumably must be right otherwise who would smoke?), but it is preferable to smoking once smoking has become routine (U (S, DS) = 8; U (S, SS) = 9). As non-smokers themselves, the authors have little difficulty in believing this.
Taking up smoking again after one has only recently stopped (U (S, DS) = 8) is more attractive than sticking to not smoking (U (D, DS) = 4). Perhaps this is why it is hard to give up?
Similarly, having started smoking, even though it was very unpleasant, it is pretty unattractive to go back to being a non-smoker (U (D, SD) = 3), while smoking is very enjoyable at this point (U (S, SD) = 11)
In the view of these authors, this set of payoffs seems highly intuitiveindeed compelling. And payoffs of this sort lead to the result that people with a shorter foresight horizon will smoke, while those with a longer foresight horizon (perhaps those who are older and wiser?) will not.
However, we note that the result is not dependent on the ordering of the payoffs so far discussed. In the payoffs shown in Table 2 the ordering is importantly different. In that case, for example, sticking to not smoking having recently given up (U (D, DS) = 10) is more attractive than going back to smoking (U (S, DS) = 5). Similarly, not continuing with smoking having started (U (D, SD) = 6) is higher up the ranking and closer to being a regular smoker (U (S, SS) = 7) than in the previous example. An agent with these preferences would appear to find it easier to give up when he wants to. It should hardly be surprising that an agent of this sort might be swayed between smoking and not smoking by the added perspective of a longer foresight horizon.
Conclusion
In this paper we have offered one interpretation of why people start smoking only to give it up later: as people grow older they gain a longer-term perspective which changes the balance of advantage away from smoking and towards not smoking. We contend that the preferences required to obtain this result are interpreted plausibly in terms of scenarios in which people start smoking only to give it up later.
We note that in our model there is no change in information (about, say the real impact of smoking). It isn't that as they grow older people discover that smoking really is unhealthy -it's not just a lie old people tell you. In our model, as people grow older they get to understand better how they will react in the future and this in turn induces a change in behavior.
Note also that our model does not rely on any change in tastes (nor in terms of the perception of an end 15 ). One important alternative approach to these questions is to regard the decision about whether to smoke as involving a time inconsistency problem. Perhaps when young people want, like the rock star, to "live fast and die young", but once they have done the living fast the dying young seems less attractive (see Laibson (1997) and more recently Harris and Laibson (2001) for an analysis of the life cycle consumption generated by such preferences).
A third approach which is, again, different from ours, follows in the Stigler and Becker (1977) tradition on "rational addiction", whereby people employ "appreciation capital" which is affected by consuming.
We do not suggest that time-consistency or appreciation capital are not important elements of an explanation about smoking. But we do suggest that our approach offers a different insight which might also be important. For example, if a longer-term perspective is likely to result in people switching away from smoking, that may make a difference to the focus and value of government information programme about smoking. Perhaps it isn't that young people lack information that smoking will damage health. Perhaps, rather, it is that young people lack wisdom, in some sense.
O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) also make distinctions between sophisticated and naive agents in the context of preferences with non-exponential discounting. In their approach, a sophisticated agent is one who is aware of his limited control capabilities and of the nature of his preferences. A naive agent is one who behaves as if he could stick to his plan afterwards, which in reality he cannot. O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001) also consider the idea of partial sophistication modelled as a convex combination between the two extreme modes of behavior outlined above. But, the O'Donoghue and Rabin approach to partial sophistication and the limited foresight approach are very different and have very different policy implications in terms of how to improve the well-being of agents.
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Proof. If Plan D is optimal with perfect foresight, then the infinite stream of payoffs received from playing D every period must be greater than that from playing S this period then playing D thereafter, for any state. But after period t + m, if D is being played from period t + 1, all subsequent payoffs will be U (D, D...D) , regardless of whether D or S is played in period t since there are only m elements in the state variable. That means that when Plan D is optimal with perfect foresight, the 2 m inequalities of the proof of Lemma 1 must hold, which is a sufficient condition for Plan D to be an LFE-(m + 1).
Proof of Proposition 2: Proof. (Sketch) Note that since (by assumption) Plan S is not optimal with perfect foresight, it cannot be true that a set of 2 m inequalities equivalent to those in the proof of Lemma 1 hold. Hence Plan S is not an LFE-(m + 1). By Lemma 1 this implies that Plan S is not an LFE-n for any n > m + 1 either. This should help to verify Proposition 2.
